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ARTICLES
THE ORIGINS OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE
CONSTITUTION
PHILIP B. KURLAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
More years ago than I can believe, when I lived the exalted life
of a Supreme Court law clerk-that category of law school gradu-
ate who knows everything there is to know about the Constitution
and most other things-I learned some basic facts of the life of the
law, the hard way. The first of these was that the right answer
depends on the right question; the second was that a right answer
was not always to be found; and the third was that if I could not
find the right answer through my research, I was not supposed to
make it up. These precepts afford the sad prologue to the tale that
this Article unfolds.
I also have tried to master another bit of wisdom, but not always
with success. It, too, relates to the subject of this Article, and it
was framed by Learned Hand in language on which I certainly can-
not improve:
You may take Martin Luther or Erasmus for your model, but
you cannot play both roles at once; you may not carry a sword
beneath a scholar's gown, or lead flaming causes from a cloister.
Luther cannot be domesticated in a university. You cannot raise
the standard against oppression, or leap into the breach to re-
lieve injustice, and still keep an open mind to every disconcert-
ing fact, or an open ear to the cold voices of doubt. I am satis-
fied that a scholar who tries to combine these parts sells his
birthright for a mess of pottage; that, when the final count is
* 0 1987 by Philip B. Kurland, William R. Kenan Distinguished Service Professor, Uni-
versity of Chicago.
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made, it will be found that the impairment of his powers far
outweighs any possible contributions to the causes he has
espoused. If he is fit to serve in his calling at all, it is only be-
cause he has learned not to serve in any other, for his singleness
of mind quickly evaporates in the fires of passions, however
holy.1
I dare say that most of the so-called literature in the field of first
amendment law-my own included-reflects the advocate with a
cause rather than disinterested scholarship. If I adhere to these
stated teachings, however, I fear that I shall have little new to of-
fer. If I abjure them, I may tickle the fancies of one set of partisans
or the other; I may display some talent for verbal pyrotechnics; or
I may show only that in some parts of the law school world, in
which the tenets of neither Richard Posner nor Duncan Kennedy
hold sway, charity is still a virtue and mindlessness a vice. Per-
haps, then, readers should concentrate on whether this Article
sticks to the straight and narrow path because, "strait is the gate,
and narrow is the way. . . and few there be that find it."' 2 Readers
may console themselves, temporarily at least, with the thought
that the learned commentators that follow will provide enlighten-
ment on this subject. Whether they are Luthers or Erasmuses I
leave to the readers' discernment.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. Prologue
The tale begins at the end. During the 1984 Term the United
States Supreme Court handed down several opinions in which it
purported to apply the provisions of the religion clauses of the first
amendment. These decisions immediately evoked a great deal of
adverse commentary. Of course, that is not at all an unusual reac-
tion to Supreme Court decisions. What might be considered un-
usual, however, was the reason for the challenges. Essentially, the
complaint was that the Court had adhered to stare decisis and had
followed its own precedents. The argument was that the Court
should have abandoned the heresies that it had perpetrated in its
1. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 138 (I. Dilliard 3d ed. 1974).
2. St. Matthew 7:14 (King James).
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earlier readings of the first amendment and should have substi-
tuted what the critics labeled "the original meaning" of the
amendment. The tone of the criticism was somewhat reminiscent
of Martin Luther's exposition of the real truth in contradiction of
that which had been expounded by the Pope and his predecessors
and the Roman Catholic hierarchy.
I do not mean to dwell on whether the true meaning of the Con-
stitution can be determined by seeking the intention of the Fram-
ers as to the contents of each of the sections, paragraphs, and
clauses of the 'written text. I do think it necessary to reveal my
general attitude, however, so that, in evaluating what I have to say,
readers may discount my bias.
My colleague Ralph Lerner and I have just edited five volumes
of documents relating to the origins of the 1787 Constitution and
the 1789 amendments thereto.3 These five volumes of double-
columned pages do not by any means constitute all of the relevant
materials. They do show, however, that even in the age of the com-
puter, when we can recapture with inordinate speed almost every
recorded word, we cannot definitively read the minds of the Foun-
ders except, usually, to create a choice of several possible meanings
for the necessarily recondite language that appears in much of our
charter of government. Indeed, evidence of different meanings
likely can be garnered for almost every disputable proposition, es-
pecially if one looks for authority not only to the members of the
1787 Convention, but also to the members of the eleven ratifying
conventions; to the members of the First Congress, who promul-
gated the Bill of Rights; and to the members of the legislatures of
the original states, who ratified those amendments. To this legisla-
tive history also must be added the arguments and teachings of
those persons who influenced the Founders' ideas, and the actions
and deeds that gave rise to the need for constitutional protections
against what the forefathers denounced as tyranny.
Do not misunderstand me. I do not deny that history is relevant
to constitutional decision, and I do not contend that the Constitu-
tion should be molded by the sitting justices either to suit their
own predilections or those of the news media or the opinion polls.
History should provide the perimeters within which the choice of
3. THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
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meaning may be made. History ordinarily should not be expected,
however, to provide specific answers to the specific problems that
bedevil the Court. Care must be taken that the so-called history is
not what historians properly denounce as "law office history," writ-
ten the way brief writers write briefs, by picking and choosing
statements and events favorable to the client's cause.
I do not deny, either, that history may afford clear and cogent
answers to some questions of original intent. This, however, points
to still another question: whether the Constitution must be given
the meaning today that it was given in 1787, or 1789, or 1868, by
those who wrote it. For example, should we adhere to our revision-
ist notion that the three vital clauses of the first section of the
fourteenth amendment were intended for the protection of individ-
uals other than the newly freed slaves? Should we stick to the pro-
position that corporations are "persons," and that they are some-
times but not always "citizens," as those words are used in the
Constitution? History tells us that these post-creation construc-
tions clearly are perversions of the original intent.
I leave such questions unanswered. I do state my prejudices,
however, which coincide with those expressed by Paul Freund
when he said that the Constitution can be regarded both as
Newtonian and Darwinian, both as a structure and an organism,"
and with Judge Learned Hand when he said:
Nor need it surprise us that these stately admonitions refuse
to subject themselves to analysis. They are the precipitates of
"old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago," originally
cast as universals to enlarge the scope of the victory, to give it
authority, to reassure the very victors themselves that they have
been champions in something more momentous than a passing
struggle. Thrown large upon the screen of the future as eternal
verities, they are emptied of the vital occasions which gave them
birth, and become moral adjurations, the more imperious be-
cause inscrutable, but with only that content which each genera-
tion must pour into them anew in light of its own experience.'
4. P. Freund, The Constitution: Newtonian or Darwinian, U.S. Dep't of Justice Bicenten-
nial Lecture, University of Chicago School of Law (1976).
5. L. HAND, supra note 1, at 163.
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B. The Intent of the Founders
Having postponed the inevitable as long as possible, I now must
address what the Founders said and did when they constitutionally
defined the relationship between government and religion. I say
"government and religion" because "church and state" is an erro-
neous label that actually describes the conflict between crown and
mitre concerning the governance of the people. In this sense, the
United States never has suffered through problems of church and
state, except perhaps in the very early history of New England.
The questions in this country have centered not on the rights of a
church but on the rights of individuals to worship, preach, and
proselytize as they choose, and to be free of any obligation to fund
the worship of others. Occasionally, Americans have become con-
fused and bemused by questions such as whether the United.
States should exchange representatives with the Vatican. That
may be a question of church and state-although I view it as a
purely political question-but it is not a question of freedom of
religion, or of establishment, as those problems were addressed by
the first amendment.
I start with the most simple of the historical questions, or at
least the one most easily answered: the challenge, most strongly
made by Attorney General Meese, that the Framers did not intend
the first amendment to be a limitation on the states when they
promulgated that amendment in 1789.6 I think that the evidence
overwhelmingly supports Attorney General Meese's position. Not-
withstanding the arguments to the contrary by my former col-
league, Professor Crosskey,7 none of the amendments in the so-
called Bill of Rights was to be applied to the states. This conclu-
sion is supported not only by the language of the first amendment,
which speaks of a limitation on Congress, but also by the fact that
when Madison first proposed an amendment to protect the free-
doms of religion, speech, press, petition, and assembly, his propo-
sal was addressed to the states as well as the national government,
but Madison's colleagues in the First Congress overwhelmingly re-
jected his proposal. They believed that the Bill of Rights was to be
6. See Meese, in Bar Group Speech, Criticizes High Court, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1985, at
A13, col. 1.
7. See W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1953).
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a response to the demands made at the state ratification conven-
tions for specific limitations on national authority, and that Con-
gress should not go beyond its charge.
The Framers' true intent is indicated in a letter that Thomas
Jefferson wrote to Rev. Samuel Miller in 1808:
I consider the government of the U.S. as interdicted by the Con-
stitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their.
doctrines, discipline, or exercises. This results not only from the
provision that no law shall be made respecting the establish-
ment, or free exercise, of religion, but from that also which
reserves to the states the powers not delegated to the U.S.'
In that letter, Jefferson declined the invitation to declare a day of
fasting and prayer, a position inconsistent with that taken by the
first President of the United States.9
While the evidence of the nonapplicability of the first amend-
ment to the states is clear and convincing as far as the intent of
the authors and ratifiers of the first amendment is concerned, that
intent alone does not answer the question whether the religion
clauses, any more than the speech and press clauses, should be
treated today solely as restraints on the national government.
Modern learning and precedents demonstrate that these provisions
of the first amendment have been held applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Justices Black and Frank-
furter, for example, engaged in a debate in Adamson v. Califor-
nial e concerning whether the fourteenth amendment incorporated
the first eight amendments in haec verba, as Justice Black con-
tended, or merely required the states to conform to the principles
of "ordered liberty," as Justice Frankfurter contended, borrowing
from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut.11
The Black-Frankfurter controversy never has been clearly re-
solved, but neither side finds much support in the legislative his-
tory of the fourteenth amendment, unless one engages in a kind of
Jesuitical or Talmudic reasoning so arcane as to be unconvincing
8. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), reprinted in 9
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 174 (P. Ford ed. 1898).
9. Id., reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 175-76.
10. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
11. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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to those of us who have disdained the art of deconstruction. The
failure of the first amendment to emerge as a control of state
action until well into the twentieth century, therefore, is not
surprising. In its present form, and not merely as applied to the
states, it is essentially a judicial construct. By this I do not mean
to demean the developed and developing law of the first amend-
ment, but only to doubt that the decision can be justified by the
form of constitutional construction that has been denominated
"original intention."
So much for the easy question. The harder question involves the
original meaning ascribed to the religion clauses as applied to the
actions of the national government. With the possible exception of
the third amendment, the meaning of the first eight amendments
is not susceptible to definition by dictionary, as a reading of these
amendments quickly makes apparent. As a result, a reference to
history is not only proper, but also necessary to discover meaning.
This reference is even more appropriate because the Constitution,
although it invoked the wisdom of savants of political theory and
law such as Locke, Coke, Montesquieu, Harrington, Rousseau, and
Hobbes, essentially was drafted to meet particular problems exper-
ienced both in the United States and in England. To a great de-
gree, the Constitution also was derived from the state constitutions
that had preceded it. One can best understand the provisions of
the Constitution dealing with religion not merely by examining
what its authors and contemporaries said about them, but also by
examining the problems that the Founding Fathers encountered,
remembered, and sought to solve.
The first amendment was not the first constitutional provision
directed to an issue of freedom of religion or establishment. Article
VI of the Constitution includes a clause, inserted after the provi-
sion requiring all government officials, both national and state, to
take an oath to support the Constitution, that provided: "no reli-
gious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
Public Trust under the United States. ' 12 Religious oaths had a
long history in England, remaining evident until the late nine-
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. This provision, too, became applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, because of the Supreme Court's decision in Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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teenth century,"3 and at the time the Constitution was adopted
they still existed in most of the states. In England, the oath re-
quired allegiance to the tenets of the Church of England, and such
an oath was required even of students and dons at Oxford and
Cambridge. In the United States, the requirement sometimes was
adherence to the established church of a particular state, some-
times simply a belief in the Holy Trinity, and sometimes an ac-
ceptance of the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testaments.
In England, the oath was part of the establishment. In the
United States, however, Oliver Ellsworth defended the abolition of
the oath in article VI in terms of freedom of religion rather than
the establishment, although the Founding Fathers usually sub-
scribed nonestablishment under freedom of religion. Ellsworth
wrote:
Some very worthy persons, who have not had great advan-
tages for information, have objected against that clause in the
constitution, which provides, that no religious Test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
the United States. They have been afraid that this clause is un-
favourable to religion. But, my countrymen, the sole purpose
and effect of it is to exclude persecution, and to secure to you
the important right of religious liberty. We are almost the only
people in the world, who have a full enjoyment of this important
right of human nature. In our country every man has a right to
worship God in that way which is most agreeable to his own con-
science. If he be a good and peaceable citizen, he is liable to no
penalties or incapacities on account of his religious sentiments;
or in other words, he is not subject to persecution.
... Test-laws are useless and ineffectual, unjust and tyranni-
cal; therefore the Convention have done wisely in excluding this
engine of persecution, and providing that no religious test shall
ever be required.' 4
13. See 1 L. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF ENGLISH THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 74 (rev.
3d ed. 1962).
14. Ellsworth, A Landholder VII (published in the Connecticut Courant, Dec. 17, 1787),
reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 449-52 (J. Kaminski & G.
Saladino eds. 1983).
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Another future Supreme Court justice delivered an encomium to
this clause in the North Carolina ratifying convention:
I consider the clause under consideration as one of the strong-
est proofs that could be adduced, that it was the intention of
those who formed this system to establish a general religious
liberty in America .... [Congress] certainly [has] no authority
to interfere in the establishment of any religion whatsoever; and
I am astonished that any gentlemen should conceive they have.
Is there any power given to Congress in matters of religion? Can
they pass a single act to impair our religious liberties? If they
could, it would be a just cause of alarm. . . .If any future Con-
gress should pass an act concerning the religion of the country,
it would be an act which they are not authorized to pass, by the
Constitution, and which the people would not obey ...
...This article is calculated to secure universal religious lib-
erty, by putting all sects on a level-the only way to prevent
persecution. . . .This country has already had the honor of set-
ting an example of civil freedom, and I trust it will likewise have
the honor of teaching the rest of the world the way to religious
freedom also.' 5
The ban on test oaths was written into the Constitution at the
1787 Convention without significant demur. After Mr. Pinckney
moved to add the provision on August 30, 1787,16 Mr. Sherman
stated that he "thought it unnecessary, the prevailing liberality be-
ing a sufficient security against such test."'11 Mr. Sherman, how-
ever, was a bit optimistic about the "prevailing liberality." Even so
modern a constitution as the one adopted by Massachusetts in
1780 had not reached the "liberality" of article VI. As Benjamin
Franklin wrote to his friend Richard Price on October 9, 1780:
I am fully of your opinion respecting religious tests; but, though
the people of Massachusetts have not in their new constitution
kept quite clear of them, yet, if we consider what the people
15. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 193-96 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) (quoting speech of James Iredell) [hereinafter
cited as ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
16. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 468 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
[hereinafter cited as RECORDS].
17. Id.
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were one hundred years ago, we must allow they have gone great
lengths in liberality of sentiment on religious subjects; and we
may hope for greater degrees of perfection, when their constitu-
tion, some years hence, shall be revised. . . .When a religion is
good, I conceive that it will support itself; and, when it cannot
support itself, and God does not take care to support it, so that
its professors are obliged to call for the help of the civil power, it
is a sign, I apprehend, of its being a bad one.18
Mr. Pinckney's "motion was agreed to nem: con:."' 9 Few provi-
sions entered the Constitution with such ease. It was not so readily
accepted, however, at all of the ratifying conventions. The records
of the Massachusetts ratifying convention, for example, reflect
that, despite a defense of the provision by Rev. Shute,2 0 Col. Jones
of Bristol
thought, that the rulers ought to believe in God or Christ, and
that, however a test may be prostituted in England, yet he
thought, if our public men were to be of those who had a good
standing in the church, it would be happy for the United States,
and that a good person could not be a good man without being a
good Christian."'
At the North Carolina convention, William Lancaster gave vent to
words also spoken elsewhere:
As to a religious test, had the article which excludes it pro-
vided none but what had been in the states heretofore, I would
not have objected to it. It would secure religion. Religious liberty
ought to be provided for. I acquiesce with the gentlemen, who
spoke, on this point, my sentiments better than I could have
done myself. For my part, in reviewing the qualifications neces-
sary for a President, I did not suppose that the pope could oc-
cupy the President's chair. But let us remember that we form a
government for millions not yet in existence. I have not the art
of divination. In the course of four or five hundred years, I do
not know how it will work. This is most certain, that Papists
may occupy that chair, and Mahometans may take it. I see noth-
18. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Richard Price (Oct. 9, 1780), reprinted in 8 THE
WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 505-06 (J. Sparks ed. 1839).
19. 2 RECORDS, supra note 16, at 468.
20. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 118-19.
21. Id. at 119.
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ing against it. There is a disqualification, I believe, in every state
in the Union-it ought to be so in this system.2"
At the Connecticut ratifying convention, Oliver Wolcott sought
to finesse the issue by suggesting that the objections to the ban on
religious oaths were answered by the implicit inclusion of a reli-
gious test in the general oath requirement.
I do not see the necessity of such a test as some gentlemen
wish for. The Constitution enjoins an oath upon all the officers
of the United States. This is a direct appeal to that God who is
the avenger of perjury. Such an appeal to him is a full acknowl-
edgment of his being and providence. An acknowledgment of
these great truths is all that the gentleman contends for. For
myself, I should be content either with or without the clause in
the Constitution which excludes test laws. Knowledge and lib-
erty are so prevalent in this country, that I do not believe that
the United States would ever be disposed to establish one reli-
gious sect, and lay all others under legal disabilities. But as we
know not what may take place hereafter, and any such test
would be exceedingly injurious to the rights of free citizens, I
cannot think it altogether superfluous to have added a clause,
which secures us from the possibility of such oppression.23
Apparently agreeing with Wolcott that an oath to support the Con-
stitution was an invocation of a commitment to God, the South
Carolina ratifying convention proposed an amendment stating:
"Resolved that the third section of the Sixth Article ought to be
amended by inserting the word 'other' between the word 'no' and
'religious.' ",24 This amendment was not considered by Congress,
but it is nonetheless instructive because the state conventions were
the sources of other amendments that were. This amendment, as
well as the preceding passages, demonstrates that the delegates to
the state conventions frequently mooted the issues of religious
freedom and establishment in their discussions of article VI.
Indeed, Justice Story believed that article VI epitomized the
conception of separation:
22. 4 id. at 215.
23. 2 id. at 202.
24. 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 645.
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This clause is not introduced merely for the purpose of satisfy-
ing the scruples of many respectable persons, who feel an invin-
cible repugnance to any religious test, or affirmation. It had a
higher object; to cut off forever every pretense of any alliance
between church and state in the national government. The fram-
ers of the constitution were fully sensible of the dangers from
this course, marked out in the history of other ages and coun-
tries; and not wholly unknown to our own. They knew that big-
otry was increasingly vigilant in its stratagems, to secure to itself
an exclusive ascendancy over the human mind; and that intoler-
ance was ever ready to arm itself with all the terrors of the civil
power to exterminate those, who doubted its dogmas, or resisted
its infallibility. The Catholic and the Protestant had alternately
waged the most ferocious and unrelating warfare on each other;
and Protestantism itself, at the very moment, that it was pro-
claiming the right of private judgment, prescribed boundaries to
that right, beyond which if any one dared to pass, he must seal
his rashness with the blood of martyrdom.2 5
The push for amendments to the Constitution, not all of which
properly could be labeled part of a "bill of rights" but all of which
were intended to impose additional restraints on national power,
came largely from the Antifederalist camp.2 8 The Federalists domi-
nated the Philadelphia convention, where they saw what they had
wrought and pronounced it good, but the Antifederalists were
more prominent, although hardly dominant, in the state conven-
tions. The Antifederalists frequently secured concessions in the
state conventions from the defenders of the 1787 document ensur-
ing, as a condition of ratification, that amendments suggested by
the state conventions would be proposed by Congress and prof-
fered to the people of the states for ratification.
25. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1841 (1833).
26. During this time, the denominations "Federalist" and "Antifederalist" did not yet
designate political parties but only attitudes. The Federalists were defenders of central gov-
ernment power, usually fearing the hegemony of a democratic legislature. This camp in-
cluded characters as disparate in attitude as Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, James
Madison, and James Wilson. The Antifederalists, on the other hand, were deeply concerned
with maintaining state government authority, largely because these governments were closer
to the people. This camp included individuals with such different voices as Luther Martin,
Melancton Smith, Thomas Jefferson, and George Mason.
[Vol. 27:839
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Alexander Hamilton essentially reflected the view of the Feder-
alists when he opined in the Federalists Papers that a bill of rights
was both unnecessary and dangerous. According to Hamilton, a bill
of rights was unnecessary because the national government under
the Constitution already could exercise only those powers dele-
gated to it, and it was dangerous because a denial of powers never
granted carried an implication that the powers inhibited by a bill
of rights somehow lurked in the interstices of the fundamental
document. Even as he introduced the proposed amendments in
the First Congress, James Madison conceded the weight of the
Hamiltonian argument, but he thought it necessary to keep faith
with the state conventions. 8
An amendment to protect religious liberty, however, was by no
means at the forefront of the Antifederalists' desires. As Jackson
Turner Main wrote:
Antifederalists were not greatly concerned about religious free-
dom under the Constitution, apparently because there was noth-
ing that threatened it and no special safeguards were deemed
necessary. A prominent Virginia Baptist thought religious free-
dom was "not sufficiently assured," and a few individuals in the
North felt that it should be expressly guaranteed; but most
opinion voiced in New England was animated by desire to ex-
clude non-Protestants from public office-not by toleration but
by intolerance. Generally, when the ratifying conventions
drafted bills of rights, they included provision for religious free-
dom as a matter of course, but other amendments were felt to be
far more important.2 9
The inclusion of the religion provisions among the suggested
amendments seems to have derived more from habit than from
reason. The written constitutions of the states at the time the na-
tional Constitution was adopted generally included some sort of re-
ligious freedom provision in their own bills of rights. These provi-
sions, however, were far from uniform in language or construction.
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright 2d ed. 1966).
28. 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 24-28.
29. J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 159 (1961) (footnotes
omitted).
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If no pattern can be discerned among the provisions of the fun-
damental documents governing religion within the colonies and the
states, a clear direction can be seen in the changes made in these
provisions from founding to statehood, which reflect a movement
toward toleration. In the beginning, some if not all of the colonies
were no more tolerant of minority religious practices than the
Mother Country whose persecution they had escaped. By the time
of the Revolution and the framing of the national Constitution,
however, almost all of the states had declared in their bills of
rights that a man's relationship with his god was a matter of indi-
vidual conscience with which the state should not interfere.
Having announced what they frequently denominated "freedom
of religion" in those terms, the states then proceeded to restrict
the benefits of this protection to less than the universe of their
citizenry. Sometimes the states protected only Protestants. At
other times, they protected only individuals who acknowledged the
divine origin of the Old and New Testaments, which, strangely
enough, if taken literally, meant that the provision applied to Prot-
estants, Catholics, and Mahometans, but not to Deists or Jews. At
still other times, the states singled out certain sects for protection
or for exclusion from protection-often Quakers and Baptists, or
certain kinds of Baptists. Test oaths of varying kinds remained a.
condition for public office in most jurisdictions, and state financial
support of chosen sects continued, even when state constitutions
forbade it.
Indeed, by 1787 the provisions of the state bills of rights had
become what Madison called mere "paper parch-
ments"-expressions of the most laudible sentiments, observed as
much in the breach as in practice.30 On the other hand, although
anticlericalism was not widespread, despite the antagonism for
Anglican bishops, who never showed up on this side of the Atlan-
tic, many state constitutions provided that no active member of
the clergy was eligible for service in the state legislature.31
30. 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 27.
31. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), the Supreme Court held that such a provi-
sion, which had found its way into a Tennessee statute, violated the first amendment. Of
course, the Court was not of one mind; the case produced four opinions, none of which was
subscribed to by a majority.
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Most states also provided for support of the clergy by taxation,
usually to pay them for teaching in schools that were expected to
indoctrinate children in religion as well as in the other "three
R's"-"readin', 'ritin', and 'rithmetic." At this time, education at
the elementary level, like charity and welfare, principally was the
concern of the parish, through its churches, and not the concern of
the government. By the late eighteenth century, however, after
many bloody legislative battles, members of nonestablished sects
frequently were relieved of the obligation to pay taxes for religious
instruction except to support the minister-teachers of their own
particular persuasion. For example, the New Hampshire Constitu-
tion of 1784 provided: "[N]o person of any one particular religious
sect or denomination shall ever be compelled to pay towards the
support of the teacher or teachers of another persuasion, sect, or
denomination. '32
In 1789, then, when Madison was called on to draft the religious
freedom provisions of the first amendment in response to a
generalized request by the state conventions for such a restraint on
the national government, no particular precedent was available to
guide him except Virginia's. Disestablishment certainly was not yet
the rule among the states. In any event, the most troublesome
problem of establishment, the test oath, already had been taken
care of by article VI of the Constitution. The other principal estab-
lishment problem, tax support for clerics engaged in education,
was not a likely national issue. Taxation of some to support the
religious activities of others, however, certainly had roiled the
states, without generating any uniform answer in practice, however
the laws were framed.
My estimate, perhaps because it satisfies my desires, is that
Madison turned to his own experience in Virginia to guide his ef-
forts, rather than looking to the sister states for enlightenment.
When the Declaration of Independence granted to the people of
Virginia the sovereignty that had belonged to the King of England,
Virginians assumed that the Anglican church, devoid of its English
hierarchy, came along with it. As a result, Virginia had an estab-
32. N.H. CONST. part I, art. 7 (1784). In contrast, the current New Hampshire Constitu-
tion provides: "[N]o person shall ever be compelled to pay towards the support of the
schools of any sect or denomination." N.H. CONST. part I, art. 6.
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lished church even after it divorced itself from England, just as
Henry VIII had an established church even after his separation
from Rome. This change required no modification of religious doc-
trine, but only a change of hierarchical authority. Parliament no
longer could dictate doctrine, but the House of Burgesses, like any
government with an established church, could. The House of Bur-
gesses often was intolerant of the behavior of the so-called "dis-
senting sects." The Quakers and Baptists generally received the
harshest treatment, although in some enactments, such as Patrick
Henry's bill establishing "a moderate assessment for the support of
the Christian religion" in 1784,"3 they were the most favored dis-
senters. In the forefront of the battle to establish religious freedom
in Virginia were Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, whose ef-
forts climaxed in Jefferson's "Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom. '3 4
Shortly after Madison helped to defeat Patrick Henry's bill,
largely through his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments,35 Madison steered Jefferson's bill into law.
Madison had to carry the whole load, because Jefferson was in
Paris in 1785. His task was made easier, however, because Patrick
Henry effectively had been silenced through his election as gover-
nor, who in Virginia had no veto power.
The substantive section, section II, was short enough to have
made an appropriate constitutional provision in its own terms:
[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any reli-
gious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be en-
forced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods,
nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
belief; but ... all men shall be free to profess, and by argument
to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion, and . . .the
same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities."6
33. See R. MEADE, PATRICK HENRY: PRACTICAL REVOLUTIONARY 278 (1969).
34. Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (Oct. 31, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 399 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1973).
35. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance (circa June 20, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 34, at 298 [hereinafter cited as Remonstrance].
36. Act for Establishing Religious Freedom § II(Oct. 31, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 34, at 400. Those who need further explication should turn
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Madison surely had these documents and experiences in mind
when he first proposed the religion clauses for adoption. Although
the significance of these documents is clear, their meaning is not.
Keeping in mind that one should not read history to accommodate
the laws when one is seeking to accommodate the laws to history, I
must confess that I have been unable to discover any recorded con-
nection between the Virginia statute and the first amendment reli-
gion clauses other than the similarity in language.
For the religion clauses, the legislative history in the House
shows only variations in wording. Madison's original submission
provided: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be estab-
lished, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience in any man-
ner, or on any pretext, be abridged." 3 In committee, this version
was shortened to: "[N]o religion shall be established by law, nor
shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." 38 Two amend-
ments were proposed in the House. Congressman Livermore of-
fered: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing
the rights of conscience."39 Congressman Ames came up with:
"Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent
the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience."40
The Senate, on the other hand, came forth with a more modest
conception of nonestablishment. The Senate version required Con-
gress to "make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of
worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion."'4' Because few
governments in the United States, since the early days of New
England, had engaged in "establishing articles of faith or a mode
of worship," the Senate version apparently cut back on the ban on
national fiscal support for religious enterprises in the House ver-
sion. Madison and the House would have none of this. The confer-
ence between the two houses, therefore, produced the amendment
first to section I of the statute, id. § I, reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON at 399-
400, and then back to the Remonstrance, supra note 35.
37. 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 25.
38. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 729 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
39. Id. at 731.
40. Id. at 766 (Aug. 20, 1789).
41. 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 166 (L. de Pauw ed. 1972) (Senate Journal).
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as we know it: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. '42
Unfortunately, the word "establishment" and the words "free
exercise" are not unambiguous. To make them more precise, if
original intention rather than current construction is sought, one
has to look at the evils that the Framers sought to abate.
Considered against the background of American history in 1789,
the Founders' general purpose is not in serious doubt. The govern-
ment was not to determine how any individual could worship God;
nor could it compel an individual, through taxation or otherwise,
to support a religious observance by an individual, whether it was
the taxpayer's own religion or someone else's. If the Founders' gen-
eration truly sought freedom for religious beliefs, however, I find
no evidence that they were equally concerned with freedom for ir-
religion. Quite to the contrary, they sought to protect man's rela-
tion to his god. Indeed, from Roger Williams through Locke
through Madison and his Remonstrance, contemporary thinkers
relied on God's will to justify nondiscrimination among any who
worshiped a single god. Deists, Jews, and Mahometans came within
the announced protection of religious freedom, but I am hard put
to find any evidence in the development of legal protection for reli-
gious freedom that indicates any intention to protect atheists.
Whether the Framers intended to protect atheists under the free
speech and free press clauses, rather than the religion clauses, is
another question. Certainly the three provisions of the first amend-
ment were overlapping rather than mutually exclusive. The speech
and press clauses were concerned with religious speech as well as
political speech. In fact, the origins of the petition and assembly
clauses are found, among other historical evils sought to be abated
by those provisions, in the Case of the Seven Bishops.43
The goal that the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Conven-
tion sought to attain with the 1789 religion amendments, in my
opinion, cannot find its precedent in Anglo-American history. Be-
tween article VI and the religion clauses, the national government
put the capstone on the movement that had become more and
more evident on this side of the Atlantic. This movement began
42. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
43. 87 Eng. Rep. 136 (1688).
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with the religious intolerance that clearly marked the beginnings of
government in New England, continued with the consistently ex-
panding religious tolerance for nonmajority sects that marked later
colonial and state governments, and culminated in the right to reli-
gious freedom embodied in the first amendment.
The national government seemed to provide for a freedom of re-
ligion distinguishable from the freedom provided by the states.
The first amendment guaranteed the right to worship and to pros-
elytize, but it also rejected, along with the explicit establishment of
a single sect, the implicit establishment of Christianity as the reli-
gion entitled to government sustenance.44 As Thomas Paine ob-
served: "Toleration is not the opposite of Intolerance, but is the
counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself
the right of withholding Liberty of Conscience, and the other of
granting it."'45 Both also purportedly were erased by the first
amendment. Tench Coxe, another prominent essayist, noted:
"Mere toleration is a doctrine exploded by our general constitu-
tion; instead of which have been substituted an unqualified admis-
sion and assertion, that their own modes of worship and of faith
equally belong to all the worshippers of God, of whatever church,
sect, or denomination. '46
At least some of the Founders, however, did not expect the reli-
gion clauses in practice to guarantee the religious freedoms stated
therein. Madison, for example, too often had seen the pious words
of state constitutions and statutes perverted by their application,
with the majority overriding the parchment guarantees given to
minorities. For the national Constitution, however, Madison
thought that his goal would be accomplished by the multiplication
of sects, which would divide and subdivide religion so that no sect
could dominate and each sect would have to allow freedom to the
others to be assured of its own freedom. The same type of theory
underlay the Constitution's complex system of separation of pow-
ers and checks and balances. 47 Madison, however, could have found
the same theory of multiplicity of sects and competition among
44. Mark DeWolfe Howe has called this the "de facto" establishment of religion. M.
HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 11-12 (1965).
45. T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 65 (1791).
46. T. CoxE, A VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 103-04 (Philadelphia 1794).
47. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 358 (J. Madison) (B. Wright 2d ed. 1966).
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them as a safeguard for religious liberty in Adam Smith's Wealth
of Nations,48 first published in the year of the American Revolu-
tion. Smith wrote:
[I]f politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the con-
quering party never adopted the tenets of one sect more than
those of another, when it had gained the victory, it would proba-
bly have dealt equally and impartially with all the different
sects, and have allowed every man to choose his own priest and
his own religion as he thought proper. There would in this case,
no doubt, have been a great multitude of religious sects. Almost
every different congregation might probably have made a little
sect by itself, or have entertained some peculiar tenets of its
own. Each teacher would no doubt have felt himself under the
necessity of making the utmost exertion, and of using every art
both to preserve and to increase the number of his disciples. But
as every other teacher would have felt himself under the same
necessity, the success of no one teacher, or sect of teachers,
could have been very great. The interested and active zeal of
religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome only where
there is either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the
whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects,
the teachers of each acting by concert, and under a regular disci-
pline and subordination. But that zeal must be altogether inno-
cent where the society is divided into two or three hundred, or
perhaps into as many thousand small sects, of which no one
could be considerable enough to disturb the public tranquil-
ity. . . . [This] might in time probably reduce the doctrine of
the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free
from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such
as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to see estab-
lished, but such as positive law has perhaps never yet estab-
lished, and probably never will establish in any country. .... 19
Hamilton, also in the true spirit of Adam Smith, added the practi-
cal assertion that true freedom of religion would be good for trade
among different communities of the nation and the world, and that
it would be an attraction for entrepreneurs and artisans, who could
48. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (J.
Rodgers 2d ed. 1880).
49. 2 Id. at 377-78.
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feel secure in their religious freedom when at best they were toler-
ated and at worst were persecuted at home.
About twenty years ago, the distinguished Harvard legal histo-
rian, Mark DeWolfe Howe, published The Garden and the Wilder-
ness.6 0 In that work, he pleaded that the Supreme Court had mis-
read history in adopting the Madisonian or Jeffersonian notion of
separation, which was concerned that the state would be mulcted
by the church to support religious activities that at least some of
the citizenry opposed. Howe conceded that this was an attitude of
many, including Virginians such as Madison and Jefferson, who
had experienced the impositions of the Church of England. He
called this attitude "a principle of politics." 1 He argued, however,
that Roger Williams had called for separation for a different rea-
son: to prevent the government from interfering in ecclesiastical
affairs. He labeled this attitude, which was prevalent in New Eng-
land, "a principle of theology. ' 52 If the New England attitude
rather than the Virginia attitude were accepted, Howe concluded,
the first amendment would forbid government actions in support
of religion only when they interfered with someone's liberties. Gov-
ernment support for religion that did not interfere with anyone's
liberty would not be banned under this interpretation.53
This substitution of evangelical separation for political separa-
tion has several difficulties. First, in terms of legislative history,
the evangelical separation position is connected to .the drafting of
the first amendment by even less evidence than the political sepa-
ration position. Second, Howe's argument necessarily assumes that
the mere use of a taxpayer's money to provide aid to religious ac-
tivity is not an interference with that taxpayer's liberty. Third, the
proposed Senate version of the religion clauses, which came closer
to the evangelical notion of separation, was rejected. 4 Fourth,
many would argue that government aid to religion would endanger
religion's independence from government in a manner best ex-
pressed by the seventeenth century maxim, "He who pays the
piper calls the tune." Howe argued that, as long as aid to religious
50. M. HowE, supra note 44.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 26.
54. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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activity is precluded, the de facto establishment of religion is pre-
served, whether that establishment is Christianity, Protestantism,
Catholicism, Methodism, or some other sectarian control in a par-
ticular geographic area.5 I can only reply that the Constitution
was concerned with limiting government and not with limiting or
enhancing ecclesiastical institutions. De facto establishment was
not an evil at which the first amendment was directed.
III. CONCLUSION
Constitutional history almost always suffers from what T.S. Eliot
described as the cruelty of mixing memory with desire.56 At best,
the past is never fully recapturable, and the parts that are recap-
turable may not be an accurate reflection of what actually oc-
curred. When the quarry is neither recorded words nor events, but
rather the state of mind that gave rise to the words or events, and
when the state of mind is not of one person but of many persons,
the pursuit of the past is almost hopeless.
Despite these problems, I think I can confidently say that the
intended direction of the first amendment was the enhancement of
individual freedom. I also am confident that the objectives were to
establish an equality among persons, so that each individual could
choose without interference how to commune with his god, and to
avoid the havoc that religious conflicts had imposed on mankind
throughout history. I doubt, however, that we can learn more from
the history of the origins of the religion clauses than the lesson Mr.
Justice Jackson derived from the first amendment as a whole when
he stated: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opin-
ion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.''57
This lesson, however, does not afford particular solutions to par-
ticular issues that come before the Supreme Court. As Justice
Jackson also observed:
55. See M. HowE, supra note 44, at 95-96.
56. T.S. ELIOT, The Waste Land, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-1962, at 53 (1963).
57. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 642, 642 (1943).
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The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to estab-
lish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts ...
• . . True, the task of translating the majestic generalities of
the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal gov-
ernment in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on
officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is
one to disturb self-confidence. These principles grew in soil
which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the
center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere
absence of governmental restraints, and that government should
be entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision
over men's affairs. We must transplant these rights to a soil in
which the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference
has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advance-
ments are increasingly sought through closer integration of soci-
ety and through expanded and strengthened governmental con-
trols. These changed conditions often deprive precedents of
reliability and cast us more than we would choose upon our own
judgment. But we act in these matters not by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions. 8
The removal of the government from matters of religion by arti-
cle VI and the first amendment have given this nation 200 years of
religious liberty. Americans have not been without religious strife
or religious bigotry during this time. On the whole, however, the
government has not participated in these conflicts and has not,
overtly at least, been guilty of religious discrimination. On this
score, the hopes if not the specific intent of the Framers seem to
have been realized. Whether Americans can continue to keep gov-
ernment out of religion and religion out of government is dubious,
especially in these times when Elmer Gantrys and George Babbitts
once more abound in the land. Thanks to the first amendment,
however, we can hope-and we can pray.
58. Id. at 638-40.
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